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Cake day: June 1st, 2023

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  • Kata1yst@kbin.socialtoTechnology@lemmy.worldThe decline of Intel..
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    6 months ago

    2009 era was also when Intel leveraged their position in the compiler market to cripple all non-Intel processors. Nearly every benchmarking tool used that complier and put an enormous handicap on AMD processors by locking them to either no SSE or, later, back to SSE2.

    My friends all thought I was crazy for buying AMD, but accusations had started circulating about the complier heavily favoring Intel at least as early as 2005, and they were finally ordered to stop in 2010 by the FTC… Though of course they have been caught cheating in several other ways since.

    Everyone has this picture in their heads of AMD being the scrappy underdog and Intel being the professional choice, but Intel hasn’t really worn the crown since the release of Athlon. Except during Bulldozer/Piledriver, but who can blame AMD for trying something crazy after 10 years of frustration?



  • Nope! And most hydrogen is fossil fuel (methane) derived and horribly energy inefficient. At this point it’s green washing at best.

    Edit: adding data:
    Steam-Methane Reforming (SMR) accounts for about 95% of all hydrogen production on earth. It uses a huge amount of heat, water, and methane to produce hydrogen.

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SMR%2BWGS-1.png

    For inputs:

    • 6.2MWh of Heat
    • 2.2 tons of Methane
    • 4.9 tons of pure water

    The outputs are:

    • 6 tons of CO2
    • 1.1 tons of H2

    The overall energy in vs energy out is at most 85% efficient. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0016236122001867

    Hydrolysis, the main competing method, and the one most touted by hydrogen backers, accounts for about 4% of hydrogen production.
    This method takes in only pure water and electricity, but it’s efficiency is abysmal at some 52%. In every case, a modern kinetic, thermal, or chemical battery will exceed this efficiency.

    Other methods are being looked into, but it’s thermodynamically impossible for the resulting H2 to produce more energy than it takes to create the H2. So at best today we could use H2 as a crappy battery, one that takes a lot of methane to create.






  • That’s called ‘privilege escalation’, and replacing system level calls with user level calls is closely watched for and guarded against with many different security measures including SELinux.

    You’ve already outed yourself multiple times in this thread as someone who doesn’t understand how security in the real world works. Take the L and try to learn from this. It’s okay not to understand something. But it’s very important to recognize when that happens and not claim to understand better than someone else.


  • I strongly disagree with your premise. Separating authentication and privilege escalation adds layers of security that are non-trivial and greatly enhance resilience. Many attacks are detected and stopped at privilege escalation, because it happens locally before a user can stop or delete the flow of logs.

    If I get into your non-privileged account I can set up a program that acts like sudo

    No you cannot. A non privileged user doesn’t have the access necessary to run a program that can accomplish this.

    And even if they do it’s too late anyway because I’ve just compromised root and locked everybody out and I’m in there shitting on the filesystems or whatever. Because root can do anything.

    Once again, you didn’t privilege escalate, because once you have a foothold (authentication) you don’t have the necessary privileges, so you must perform reconnaissance to identify an exploitable vector to privilage escalate with. This can be any number of things, but it’s always noisy and slow, usually easy to detect in logs. There is a reason the most sophisticated attacks against well protected targets are “low and slow”.

    And if I can’t break into your non-privileged account then I can’t break into a privileged account either.

    You’re ignoring my points given regarding the risks of compromised keys. If there are no admin keys, there are no remote admin sessions.

    These artificial distinctions between “non-privileged” and “superuser” accounts need to stop. This is not good security, this is not zero trust. Either you don’t trust anybody and enforce explicit privilege escalation for specific things, or just accept that you’re using a “super” paradigm and once you’ve got access to that user all bets are off.

    Spoken like someone who has never red teamed or purple teamed. Even admin accounts are untrusted, given only privileges specific to their role, and closely monitored. That doesn’t mean they should have valid security measures thrown away.


  • Wouldn’t separate SSH keys achieve the same?

    Separate ssh keys for the user and the admin? Yeah, see point 2, admins should not be remotely accessible.

    Really? How, exactly? Break the ssh key authentication? And wouldn’t that apply to all accounts equally?

    Keys aren’t perfect security. They can easily be mishandled, sometimes getting published to GitHub, copied to USB drives which can easily be lost, etc.

    Further, there have been attacks against SSH that let malicious actors connect remotely to any session, or take over existing sessions. By not allowing remote access on privileged accounts, you minimize risk.

    Forcing a non privileged remote session to authenticate with a password establishes a second factor of security that is different from the first. This means a cracked password or a lost key is still not enough for a malicious actor to accomplish administrative privileges.

    A key is something you have

    A password is something you know

    So, by not allowing remote privileged sessions, we’re forcing a malicious actor to take one more non-trivial step before arriving at their goals. A step that will likely be fairly obvious in logs on a monitored machine.